

Talking Barents

The Barents Review is published by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat

Since its establishment in 1993, the Norwegian Barents Secretariat has stimulated Norwegian-Russian relations in the north by promoting and funding Norwegian-Russian cooperation projects. In addition to its role as grant maker, the Secretariat is today also a regional information and competence centre, as well as a support organization for the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation.

The Barents Cooperation includes 13 regional subjects from four countries: Finnmark, Troms and Nordland (Norway); Norrbotten and Västerbotten (Sweden); Lapland, Oulu and Kainuu (Finland); Murmansk Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Republic of Karelia, Republic of Komi and Nenets Autonomous Okrug (Russia). The main cooperation structures in the region are the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Barents Regional Council.

Read more about the Norwegian Barents Secretariat and the Barents Cooperation at:
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Talking Barents

People, borders and regional cooperation

Edited by
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The Norwegian Barents Secretariat
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Preface

The further north you go the better East-West relations get, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov highlighted when visiting Kirkenes in summer 2008. During that visit, he several times underlined that the Barents Cooperation is a successful initiative for regional cooperation.

What makes the North special in East-West relations? What has made the Barents Cooperation a cross-border success story? Those are two of the key questions in this edition of the Barents Review.

The growing focus on natural resources, security and Big Politics in the Arctic opens a number of new opportunities, as well as challenges, for the established cooperation structures in the region. At the same time, expanding cross-border economic and human contacts require a rethinking of cross-border regimes.

Regional cooperation is bound to encounter new challenges as new economic and political realities develop. How can the Barents Cooperation continue to be a successful platform for East-West cooperation?

The Barents Review is developed and written by the staff of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat. This year's edition has chapters about political challenges, security, project cooperation, energy and transport, cross-border travel, Russian regional developments and indigenous peoples.

A 600 respondent poll conducted by the Foris Sociological Institute in Arkhangelsk has been conducted as part of the Review work. The poll is based on respondents from Murmansk City and the Pechenga Rayon (Murmansk Oblast).

The Barents Review is developed as a response to what the Barents Secretariat sees as a generally growing need for information about developments in the Barents Region. In the publication, the contributors present views and assessments of the situation in the Nordic-Russian High North. Being neither researchers, nor policymakers, they present practically-oriented and experience-based analysis and reflections, as well as recommendations, for the international cooperation in the region.

The Barents Review is a voice of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat. This publication is the first in what is planned to become annual editions.

*Rune Rafaelsen,
General Secretary of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat*

Introduction

New times for Barents Cooperation

Atle Staalesen

«Our dangerous neighbour» was the headline of Der Spiegel's September 2008 edition, which gave wide coverage of the situation in South Ossetia and Georgia. «The dangerous neighbour» was Russia, which for the first time in its Post-Soviet period had invaded a foreign country.¹

The Trans-Caucasian conflict strained relations between Russia and its neighbouring states. By many, the war was seen as a clear illustration of an increasingly assertive and hostile Russia, which with enhanced force was challenging the established European security order. An East-West chill unprecedented in the Post-Soviet period followed the war. Newly instated Russian President Dmitry Medvedev himself admitted that the conflict heightened tensions far beyond the region, in all of Europe and even in the world as a whole.²

The Der Spiegel headline touched upon a long-lived perception of fear, still much alive among many of Russia's neighbours – the picture of a big, unpredictable and powerful Russia which aggressively pursues its national interests beyond its national borders.

To a significant extent, the war in the Caucasus and the period which followed also illustrated a remaining East-West political divide in Europe, with substantially diverging views on European developments, and with a Russia still sidelined in a number of key decision making processes vital for European security and cooperation.

The war added new force to the debate about Russia's role in European affairs and the country's relations with western neighbours and the EU. To what extent should Russia be perceived as a threat? How can the country be included in European integration processes?

The Barents Region is far away from the Caucasus and has a substantially different political and cultural distinction. This is Russia's most quiet and stable border area. Still, also this is a region of increasing relevance to European East-West relations. Following Arctic ice melting, the opening of new transport routes, enhanced availability of regional natural

resources and conflicting bids for Arctic shelf areas, this region is one of growing national interest both for Russia and its regional neighbours, as well as for outside powers.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation has for more than 16 years successfully brought people, politicians and businesses closer together across the regional East-West borders. With its prime focus on the regional level of power and people-to-people relations, this cooperation has a low-level and practical approach. However, in the future, this initiative could possibly take on new tasks and responsibilities, which include politically more sensitive issues.

What is the future of the Barents Cooperation? How will the regional cooperation be affected by big state politics, energy politics and the enhanced international interest?

Foreign policy in the neighbourhood

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 10 June 2008 met with his Norwegian counterpart Jonas Gahr Støre in the Norwegian border town of Kirkenes. In the premises of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, Mr Lavrov said that «the further north, the closer relations between East-West».³

Mr. Lavrov proclaimed that he highly values the Barents Cooperation, saying that it is «unique in its kind» and that «the format of the cooperation today remains innovative».⁴

The ministers' meetings in Kirkenes and Murmansk on 10-11 June marked an unprecedented joint Norwegian-Russian diplomatic encounter in the High North. The two ministers had together gone to the outermost province of Europe to discuss regional initiatives and cooperation across borders.

Lavrov's statements, which seemed to leave no doubt about Russia's commitment towards cooperation in the Barents Region, came just about a month ahead of newly elected President Dmitry Medvedev's presentation of his new Foreign Policy Concept, a document outlining the country's main foreign policy objectives. In that document, regional relations play a central role as one of five top priority areas.⁵

President Medvedev later in a newspaper interview elaborated on this point in the new foreign policy document, highlighting the importance of good relations with neighboring states.

«It must be completely clear that we are interested in a stable situation in relations with all our neighbors, absolutely with all of them, [...] even the ones with which we have the most complicated relations [...] What does this mean? It means a simple, but

very clear thing: our neighbors, are, without any doubt, countries which are close to us and which are in our traditional sphere of interests, the same way as Russia is in their sphere of interest», the president said.⁶

«Good relations with our neighbors is priority number one for us», he conclusively stressed.

The positive foreign policy statements and signals of President Medvedev and his top foreign policy spokesman however never really moved the ground in East-West relations. Less than a month after the publication of the Foreign Policy Concept, Georgia on 7 August attacked South Ossetia and triggered brute military response from Russia. Following a period of increasing chill between Russia and several western states, the war sparked outright tensions between the European East and West.

East-West tensions

Following the war, Russia was increasingly described as a threat to its neighbouring states, not only in the Caucasus, but even in northern Europe. Harsh statements were made by a number of western state leaders. The most negative ones came from the countries traditionally most critical of Russia. President of Estonia Toomas Henrik Ilves in an article in Newsweek maintained that Russia now threatens European stability and state order.

We now find ourselves in a new security situation, one that threatens to reverse the advances of the past two decades. This world is one where authoritarian capitalism and massive oil wealth could become a plausible alternative to liberal democracy [...] While its economy may be small, however, this Russia is powerful in other ways, and neither the United States nor Europe is equipped to deal with it alone⁷

However, also the Nordic countries with strong words criticized Russia for its actions in South Ossetia and Georgia. Sweden, which over the last several years has experienced generally cool political relations with Russia, reacted sharply on Russia's action in its southern neighbourhood. Foreign Minister Bildt said that "the Russian offensive against and in Georgia is acts of aggression not compatible with international law and basic principles of security and cooperation in Europe", and even drew a comparison of the Russian action with the wars of Slobodan Milosevich and Adolph Hitler.⁸

In the middle of the crisis, Bildt lifted the growing East-West controversy to a new level, saying that common values can no longer serve as the basis for Russia-EU relations. «We can still talk about common interests, but not common values», he underlined and at the same time called for the EU to reassess its relations with the Russians.⁹

In Norway, a group of opposition parliament members indicated that the Georgia war illustrated a Russia which is a growing threat against its neighbours, and that Norway eventually could face Russian trouble in its High North.¹⁰

This increasing Nordic wariness about Russia was given additional force by several statements from Russian politicians and high-ranking officials. Among them were Armed Forces representatives who said that the upcoming Russian Defence Doctrine will include high stress on border conflicts¹¹, the Air Force general confirming that more armed border conflicts are likely¹², as well as official documents like the new National Security Strategy stating that conflicts over hydrocarbons, even in the Arctic, might eventually result in armed conflicts and subsequent changing power balance in Russian border areas.¹³ Seen on the backdrop of the boost in Russian strategic bomber flights over the North Atlantic and Northern Fleet activities, the Russian statements boosted scepticism about contemporary Russia.¹⁴

On Norwegian and Finnish government level, the Russian policies have been described in clear-worded but diplomatic manners. Norway's new main High North document describes contemporary Russian foreign policies as heavyfronted («foroverlent»)¹⁵ while Finland's new Russia strategy reads that Russia's positions have «a touch of grandiosity».¹⁶

In a speech held in Oslo in early January 2009, Norwegian Defence Minister Strøm-Erichsen said that «the events in the Caucasus absolutely give reason for thought [...] The Russian tone towards the West has become tougher, and the war with Georgia has considerably exacerbated the situation».¹⁷

The year 2008 put security relations in Europe to the test and spurred international uncertainty about Russian positions in neighborhood cooperation. Although relations slightly improved in 2009, many of the same basic problems remains not resolved. How, then, is the situation in the Barents Region? What do people living the border areas between Norway, Finland and Russia think about the state of East-West relations?

The poll ordered by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat shows a picture quite different from one of growing tensions on Big Political level. In the poll, more than 81 percent of respondents say they want more cooperation with Norway and western countries.¹⁸ Asked about relations and views on NATO, as many as 63 percent say they want Russia and NATO to make common efforts to strengthen security in the Arctic.

As illustrated by Trude Pettersen in her chapter on military relations in the region, security cooperation between Norway and Russia continues to develop positively despite generally heightened tensions in East-West relations. A main reason for that, she argues,

is a relationship based on trust and cooperation, developed over several years of cross-border cooperation and confidence-building.

That is highlighted also by Rune Rafaelsen in his chapter about the political cooperation in the Barents Region. Rafaelsen, the General Secretary of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, argues that regional cooperation is instrumental in the strengthening of international stability. «Regions do not go to war», he emphasizes.

Building openness

The Barents Review poll not only shows a high level of Russian support for enhanced international cooperation in the High North. It also shows a major interest in cross-border travelling. While only 22 percent of the respondents say they have been in Norway, more than 70 percent of all respondents confirm their interest to travel to the country (more often), should facilitated visa regulations open for that.

These poll results should be music in the ears of Norwegian authorities and especially Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, who on a number of occasions has highlighted the important security aspects of wide-reaching and multi-level openness and cooperation with Russia.

The Norwegian-Russian border should in the future be a bridge, and not a fence, and Norwegian-Russian cross-border relations should be as good as between the Nordic countries, Minister Støre has maintained on several occasions. That ambition is included also in the government's latest Foreign Policy Report No 15¹⁹, as well as in its new High North report²⁰. The latter report actually claims that the process is well underway – «Norway and Russia are about to grow together as neighbors», it reads.

Despite high ambitions and promising statements, the realities do however not always match. Judging from people living in the Norwegian-Russian border areas, the ambitions and visions of Mr. Støre and his foreign ministry will need to be followed up by practical travelling facilitation.

In a televised interview with NRK, local journalist from the Russian border town of Nikel, Denis Shirshov, said that «cooperation between Norway and Russia is still taking place first of all on authority level» and that “the general public in the border areas hardly notices any of it». ²¹

Shirshov is one of many locals in Nikel frustrated about difficulties linked with applying for visa to Norway. In the municipality of Pechenga, about 40,000 people live within an hour drive from the Norwegian border. However, with border crossing procedures

being a complicated process, only a minor percentage of the population in the border area have travelled to neighboring Norway.

«I would like to go to Norway, but it takes too much time to travel the 200 kilometers to Murmansk to receive the visa documents. In worst case I have to make the trip several times before everything is in order», another Nikel inhabitant told NRK.²²

The Barents Review poll shows a high interest in travelling between Murmansk Oblast and Norway. As Thomas Nilsen points out in his chapter on cross-border travelling, regulations and red tape on the Norwegian-Russian border hamper contacts and cooperation in the region. Nilsen proposes several concrete measures how to facilitate cross-border travelling in the area.

The Border Zone

Russia has on government level previously expressed strong commitment towards both facilitated travel and cross-border cooperation. However, the country still has no federal law on cross-border cooperation, only a so-called concept document on cross-border cooperation and a document on the Principles of Border Policy.²³

In the Russian Concept on Border Cooperation of 2001²⁴, a number of wide-reaching proposals on cross-border cooperation are proposed. The document highlights the importance of trust, mutual understanding and good neighbor relations between authorities, businesses and the populations on both sides of the border line. Among the document's proposals is the development of joint social and economic infrastructure across the borders, as well as joint cross-border problem resolution of economic, transport, energy, municipal, environmental, social-demographical, humanitarian and several other issues.

Interestingly, the document also opens up for wide-reaching international agreements and cooperation on regional and municipal level within a number of very concrete fields of cooperation, among them justice, labor and transportation.

Also Murmansk Oblast has elaborated a Concept on Border Cooperation. That document, which was adopted in June 2008, similarly opens up for extensive cross-border cooperation between local authorities, the formation of joint coordination structures and working groups, as well as the conclusion of cross-border agreements. Investments, trade, natural resource development, transport, information and environment are among the top areas of cooperation outlined in the document.²⁵

Both the federal 2001 document and the regional document from Murmansk, can be used as a starting points for new initiatives. Among those can be the proposed Twin

City cooperation between the border towns of Kirkenes and Nikel, facilitated local cross-border travelling regulations, as well as the idea of a joint economic and industrial Pomor Zone in the Norwegian-Russian coastal borderlands.

At the same time, regional authorities in Murmansk openly admit that legislation on the Russian side is insufficient for the development of wide-reaching cross-border cooperation. In a meeting with the town mayor of the Norwegian border town of Kirkenes in September 2009, chairman of the Murmansk regional parliament Yevgeny Nikora stressed that Murmansk Oblast has a major unused potential for cross-border cooperation.²⁶

Barents politics

Rune Rafaelsen in his chapter about High North foreign policy argues that local-level cooperation and initiatives make up a key part of the Barents Cooperation and include important security components.

The same is illustrated by Margrethe Alnes in her chapter about the Norwegian Barents Secretariat's grant programme. Small and medium-sized cross-border projects have the potential to spur contacts, strengthen knowledge and understanding and promote development and stability across borders, she argues.

Still, the Barents Cooperation was from its beginning in 1993 first of all a political project including on the one hand regional politicians and officials from 13 Nordic and North-west Russian regions and on the other hand national government ministers. And it is primarily this political model which makes the Barents initiative a curiosity in international affairs.

How then to preserve the ideals of regional political cooperation in a time of big power focus on the region and growing pressure from industry and outside powers?

As noted above, the Barents Cooperation does have firm backing on government level. In an OECD meeting in Madrid in November 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) «continues to be firmly established in the role of a major instrument for building in the North of Europe an area of stability, trust and sustainable development». ²⁷ That same commitment was also clearly stated in the Barents Council meeting in Murmansk in October 2009.

[...] I would like to stress the unchanged support for the Barents Euro-Arctic Council from the Russian side. Once again, I would like to underline that the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, along with the Arctic Council, from the Russian point of view is the most important inter-governmental organization in this region.²⁸

In his concluding words at the session, Mr. Lavrov also said that the Barents Cooperation «helps resolve real practical questions, is of real use to the people [in the region], demonstrates an ability to react on the changing situation, [and] has excellent perspectives for further development».²⁹

The Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation is also mentioned in the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept as «a practical cooperation of joint projects».³⁰

For Norway, the Barents Cooperation plays the role of contact and cooperation stimulator in relations with Russia.

Some have hinted, however, that the focus on the Barents Cooperation structures gradually might expand from today's main issues of people-to-people cooperation, environment, transport, communication, education and indigenous peoples, into new and politically more sensitive affairs.

In an interview with the Regnum news agency, Russian Chairman of the Barents Council Anton Vasiliev late 2008 said the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Arctic Council both can be bodies for the handling of key international challenges in the Arctic like climate change.³¹

Similarly, the Barents Cooperation might in the years to come see a stronger involvement of the European Union. The Commission, an observer in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, has with its new Arctic Communication presented early 2009 outlined a stronger focus on the High North, and will be in need of anchor points in region. The Barents experiences could provide useful contributions in the process of strengthening the Northern Dimension concept, as well as in the ongoing negotiations on a successor agreement of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.³²

What then would be the consequences of a stronger politization of the Barents Cooperation? Would the initiative be in danger of outplaying its role as low-level stimulator of affairs? Or would the structures prove strong enough to take on the new tasks and become a platform for Big Political talks?

In his chapter, Rune Rafaelsen argues that the Barents cooperation model is unique and therefore could be «exported» to other regions with similar challenges. At the same time, he also highlights the need for a modernization of the cooperation structures.

Energy cooperation

Talking to a representative of BarentsObserver.com during the Barents Euro-Arctic Council meeting in Rovaniemi 2007, Russian Foreign Ministry representative Mikhail Kamynin confirmed that the energy potential of the Barents Region is vital for regional cooperation. «Energy is in the centre, and can function as a platform for joint action», he said.³³

That was highlighted also by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov two years later in the Barents Council meeting in Murmansk 2009:

A powerful factor in strengthening regional collaboration will doubtless be efforts to implement the existing plans for developing the hydrocarbon resources of the Barents Sea continental shelf, and to launch other promising projects for exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the Arctic seabed and subsoil and developing and improving infrastructure. In general, hardly anyone would argue with the fact that the role of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council in Arctic and, indeed, world affairs objectively will only increase.³⁴

The meeting in Murmansk was held ahead of the Murmansk Economic Forum, an event which was dedicated to the «conquering of the Arctic»³⁵, and first of all to the development of the Shtokman field. Speaking to the four foreign ministers and the many dignitaries, Murmansk Governor Dmitry Dmitriyenko in his meeting speech highlighted the international character of the Shtokman development, and said that the Barents Cooperation actually can be seen as a preparation for that project. «In some sense, 15 years of strengthening the Barents Cooperation may be seen as preparation for the steps that we will have to take in the nearest future», the governor said.³⁶

Energy, without doubt, is a driving force in the rapidly growing international interest in the Barents Sea. That is illustrated clearly also in all the Arctic policy documents presented in 2008 and 2009 by both Norway, Russia, the USA and EU.

What role will the Barents Cooperation play in what could become an Arctic oil and gas bonanza? Oddgeir Danielsen in his chapter argues that the Barents Region with its strategic geographical position will have to play a key role in shipping, offshore hydrocarbon projects and infrastructure development. Continued cooperation is the key prerequisite for stability in the Arctic, he writes, and highlights the role of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council.

Despite the last year's energy disputes in Europe, Russia repeatedly has stressed its commitment to international energy cooperation. In a seminar in February 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev highlighted that «we want Russia's participation in international energy cooperation to become more efficient, we want to give the cooperation more weight, more effect».³⁷

More international energy cooperation is supported also by our Russian respondents. In the poll, as many as 67,5 percent of respondents say they want more international cooperation in Arctic hydrocarbon development.³⁸

Regional components

Although the Kirkenes Declaration of 1993 – the founding document for the Barents Cooperation – does not include any mandate for the Barents Regional Council nor any description of the council's functions, the cooperation between the 13 regional administrations has still become a backbone in the Barents Cooperation.³⁹

The declaration was signed at a time when Russian regions were boosting their sovereignty and political and economic independence from Moscow. The young Russian Federation was threatened by economic collapse and federal disintegration and the weakened Kremlin struggled to come to terms with itself and its new role in national and international politics.

More than 16 years later, the situation is all different with a powerful Moscow having brought the regions back into the fold and confidently behaving in international affairs.

What is the current state of affairs in Russian centre-periphery affairs? What impact has the centralization trend had on the Russian regions' ability to participate in foreign policy initiatives?

In his chapter on the role of the Russian federal subjects, Andrey Shalyov maintains that the Russian regions today have very limited space for independent political maneuvering. At the same time, he indicates that Moscow might have taken the centralization of the country too far, and that Russia in the years to come could face new problems in centre-regional affairs.

Christina Henriksen in her chapter on indigenous peoples describes how Saami and Nenets communities interact with regional authorities. The quest for enhanced self-government in local indigenous communities remains a politically sensitive and controversial issue, she concludes. She also maintains that the rapidly proceeding development of industrial projects in the region poses a major challenge to the indigenous peoples in the region. A consequence of this development is a higher level of political awareness in several of the indigenous peoples' communities.

The current situation in Russian centre-periphery relations can be illustrated by the Yuri Yevdokimov case. The 13 years long serving Murmansk governor was dismissed in March 2009 following his critical statements against the United Russia Party and its

behavior in the local city mayor election campaign. That criticism triggered harsh reactions both from Russian President Medvedev and United Russia representatives.

President Medvedev in early March gave the governor «one last warning» and told him to concentrate on solving domestic problems instead of «fooling around abroad».⁴⁰

A presidential aide added more fuel to the fire, saying that Yevdokimov is «accused of betraying Russian interests in the Arctic and wanting to detach the Oblast from Russia and give it to the Scandinavians and Americans who are fighting for their interests in the Arctic, especially when it comes to development of the Shtokman gas field».⁴¹

The statements discredited the governorship of Yevdokimov and sent a very clear message about expected regional conduct in international affairs.

Reforming regional cooperation

Although not formalized in the Kirkenes Declaration, the regional political dimension has been described as one of the most unique and basic elements in the Barents initiative. Hardly anywhere else in Europe, Russian regions are engaged in a cross-border initiative like this.

However, the Barents Regional Council might need to face major reform should it continue to play a key role in the cooperation. According to a report on the cooperation structures from 2005, the council should be made more efficient and attractive.⁴² Today, only a few of the regional working groups are fully up running. The council sessions are attended by a limited number of regional leaders and the issues of discussion are considered of moderate interest to the respective region.

This apparent lack of appeal with the Barents Regional Council is reflected also in regional policy documents. For example, the Murmansk regional International Policy and Foreign Trade document from 2007 says nothing about Barents Cooperation.⁴³

Interestingly, while the Barents Cooperation is positively assessed by the national governments in the region, the regional administrations seem to show limited interest in the political cooperation. That could open up for speculations about the regional leaders' actual interest in cross-border political interaction.

That speculation is nurtured by the fact that the new Barents Programme adopted by the Regional Council in November 2008 says nothing about how to strengthen the political power of the structure. The programme seems to leave the regional-level cooperation with practical projects and business initiatives, but not with joint political

leadership. To a significant extent, that worrisome trend is confirmed also by the 2005 report from Erling Fløtten.

As outlined by the contributors to the Barents Review, the Barents Region in the years to come offers new vast opportunities for continued international cooperation. However, at the same time, the Barents Cooperation also faces serious challenges. Long term perspectives and a high level of engagement on both local, regional, national and international level of power will help the regional cooperation continue to be an East-West success initiative.

Footnotes

- ¹ Der Spiegel, «Der Gefährliche Nachbar» Nr. 34/18.8.08
- ² Medvedev, Dmitry. «Poslanie federalnomu sobraniu Rossiiskoy Federatsii», *Kremlin.ru* (http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/11/05/1349_type63372type63374type63381type82634_208749.shtml) 5 November 2008
- ³ «Zakluchitelnoe slovo Ministry inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova na vstreche s predstavitel'yami delovykh krugov i mestnykh organov vlasti Rossii i Kirkenesa, 10 iyunia 2008», *Mid.ru* (http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/1F2AAD382192E807C32574640046A1A8)
- ⁴ «Kommentarii Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova v svyazi s poseshcheniem Mezhdunarodnogo sekretariata I Norvezhskogo natsionalnogo Barentsego sekretariata, Kirkenes, 10 iyunia 2008 goda», *Mid.ru* (http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/EDFC9A60A4C13170C32574640044DDC5)
- ⁵ *Kontseptsia vnesbney politiki rossiiskoi federatsii.* (<http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/07/204108.shtml>)
- ⁶ «Utrachennye illuzii» *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, (<http://www.rg.ru/2008/09/15/medvedev.html>) 15 September 2008
- ⁷ Ilves, Toomas Hendrik. «The challenge in Europe» *Newsweek Special Edition Issues 2009*, page 35
- ⁸ «Bildt: Illavarslande ryska motiv». *Svenska Dagbladet* (http://www.svd.se/nyheter/utrikes/artikel_1542205.svd) 9 August 2008
- ⁹ «Swedish Foreign Minister sees Russia moving away from European values», *Helsingin Sanomat* (<http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Swedish+Foreign+Minister+sees+Russia+moving+away+from+European+values/1135239631101>)
- ¹⁰ «South Ossetia war spurs defence debate in Scandinavia». *BarentsObserver.com* (<http://www.barentsobserver.com/index.php?id=4501629>) 15 August 2008
- ¹¹ «Armia stanet mobilney», *Vedomosti* (<http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/12/30/176037>)
- ¹² «Glavkom VVS ne iskluychil vovlechenia Rossii v prigranichnye konflikty», *RIA Novosti* (http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20090210/161576805.html) 10 February 2009
- ¹³ *Strategia natsionalnoy bezopastnosti Rossiskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda* (<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html>)

- ¹⁴ Also the Russian document on the Principles of Russian State policies towards the Arctic, adopted by the Russian Security Council in the fall of 2008, places a high stress on Arctic border guarding and protection, as well as the support of military forces in the region.
- ¹⁵ *Nye byggesteiner i nord. Neste trinn i regjeringens nordområdestrategi.*
(http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Nordomradene/byggesteiner_nord.pdf)
- ¹⁶ *Regeringens handlingsprogram för Ryssland.*
(<http://formin.finland.fi/Public/Print.aspx?contentid=162788&nodeid=32281&culture=sv-FI&contentlan=3>)
- ¹⁷ «Det moderne innsatsforsvaret - fra fremtidsvisjon til realitet» *Regjeringen.no*
(http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dep/forsvarsminister_anne-grete_strom-erichs/taler_artikler/2008/det-moderne-innsatsforsvaret—fra-fremti.html?id=541542)
- ¹⁸ That is almost eight percent more than in a similar poll conducted by Foris and ordered by the Norwegian Barents Secretariat in 2005. Then, 72,2 percent of the 600 respondents said they want Murmansk Oblast to pay more attention to international cooperation.
- ¹⁹ *St.melding Nr 15 Interesse, ansvar og muligheter. Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk.*
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